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 Agency sick leave policies are often problematic.  Employees, encouraged 
to come to work bank sick leave for years then, in the twilight of their careers, 
‘burn’ sick leave in order to accrue the maximum use of this benefit, potentially 
leaving the organization with a manpower shortage.  The purpose of this project 
is to provide the impetus to create a balanced sick leave policy that recognizes 
the needs of both employer and employee.  Using a survey and available 
literature to define the problem and search for possible solutions, this paper can 
be used to as a starting point to examine the effects sick leave policies and 
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 Sick leave is an important component of any employee’s benefit package.  As 
such, some employers allow their personnel to accrue sick leave with no limitations.  
However, when an employee leaves, the organization may pay the employee for some, 
all, or none of his remaining accumulated sick time.  Organizations that do not “buy 
back” all of an employee’s excess sick leave risk having that employee use their 
remaining sick time at the end of their careers in an attempt to maximize the benefit 
“owed” that employee for years of selfless service.  This holds true in the law 
enforcement career field as well as private industry.  
Unfortunately, this type of behavior creates problems for an organization.  The 
employee cannot be replaced until they have retired, resulting in a temporary personnel 
shortage.  And, depending on the employee’s position within the organization, the 
administration or command structure of the agency can be paralyzed as the retiring 
official is considered to be occupying a position even if he is not at work. 
 This is a problem that plagues the San Angelo Police Department (SAPD).  
Already finding it difficult to recruit and retain personnel, the department faces the 
possibility that an inordinate number of officers will retire within the next few years.  
SAPD is governed by Section 143 of the Texas Local Government Code, commonly 
known as civil service.  Texas civil service law allows officers unlimited accrual of sick 
time at the rate of ten hours per month.  However, when an officer retires, the city only 
reimburses the employee for 720 hours of sick leave, with the officer losing any time in 
excess of ninety days.  It is common practice, which SAPD allows, for retiring officers to 
“burn” sick leave in excess of 720 hours, despite an obvious conflict with written policy. 
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The purpose of this project is to provide the impetus for the creation of a new sick 
leave “buy back” policy.  The new policy will need to create an incentive for officers to 
not use sick leave at the end of their career.  Ideally, both city administrators and police 
personnel will be involved in the search for an acceptable solution.  The intent of this 
research is to determine what options exist that will curb officers from using accrued sick 
leave during and at the end of their careers while fairly compensating them for accruing 
sick leave throughout their tenure.   
 The intent of this research is to present a balanced view of this issue.  The city 
government code and the San Angelo Police Department’s sick day policy will be 
considered.  Further, other resources will be taken into account.  However, the main 
focus of the research will be on survey information received from other law enforcement 
agencies and privately owned businesses.  
 The anticipated findings are a number of options that can help resolve this 
problem.  These concepts may come from government agencies or private businesses.  
Quite likely a combination of the above will provide reasonable ideas.  
 Notwithstanding the ethical issues involved, there are dangers in pursuing this 
issue.  Institutional thought--the acceptance of status quo--is being challenged and this 
is rarely popular.  Yet as Maxwell (2003) has asserted, “unpopular thinking asks 
questions and seeks options” (p. 202).   
Further, a compromise will be nearly impossible to achieve should either party 
prove intransigent.  The city government is in a position to impose a policy that may be 
viewed as unreasonable; leaving the officers to question why “well enough” was not left 
alone.  In turn, officers will be less likely to sacrifice for the “general good” at a later date.  
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Yet, because this issue places the department in a potentially devastating personnel 
situation, it needs to be examined. 
 Whether or not San Angelo forges a compromise, the law enforcement 
community will benefit from this research by offering a number of ideas to resolve this 
problem.  At the very least, the information contained in this paper will offer a starting 
point for others to continue future research.  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 Sick leave is a benefit that organizations should offer their employees.  If an 
employer does not offer sick leave, it “would accelerate health problems and the spread 
of illness, thereby lowering [employee] productivity and morale” (Smith, 2001).  
However, according to Orrick (2004), sick leave was originally intended as a privilege 
but over the years has come to be viewed by employees as an entitlement.   The result 
is that some employees feel justified in maximizing this ‘entitlement’ any way they can, 
including using sick leave even when they are not ill (Knight, 1973).  This type of 
behavior is stressing to an organization, particularly when the employee is preparing for 
retirement and begins to take more and more sick time in an attempt to use up what 
leave time he may have remaining.  
 To be sure, employee absenteeism is a problem that affects organizations of 
every type (Goodman, Atkin, and Associates, 1984).  And according to Menchen (1996) 
the problem is getting worse as more and more employees take “unscheduled absences 
to deal with family issues, stress and personal needs” (p. 17).  In fact, one study 
indicated that “78% of all sick time is being used by employees who aren’t sick at all” 
(Gillette, 1998, p. 10). 
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 Estimates of the cost of absenteeism vary.  In terms of man-hours, one source 
estimates that in the public sector 9.2 work days per employee are lost annually to sick 
leave while 7.5 days per employee are annually lost to illness in the private sector (Hunt, 
2000).  And the dollar cost of absenteeism can be crippling.  Cost estimates for 
unplanned absenteeism have recently risen from $602 (Smith, Part I, 2001) to $789 
(Reed, 2003) annually per employee.  Orrick (2004) contends that unscheduled 
absenteeism costs organizations “an additional 150 percent over the budgeted amount 
to cover the vacancies with overtime pay” (p. 39). 
 From January thru June 2004, the San Angelo Police Department used 78.25 
hours of overtime to cover officers who called in sick.  At approximately $19.00 per hour, 
the cost to pay the overtime as well as the ill officer’s regular salary would equate to a 
cost of over $7400.00 for the entire year.     
 More than just dollar costs are involved.  Unscheduled absenteeism impacts the 
effectiveness of an organization.  Schedules are disrupted as projects are postponed 
just to cover the organization’s daily needs.  Training is cancelled when employees 
cannot attend because they must fill-in for missing co-workers (Gwaltney, 1994).  
Productivity and quality slip as both supervisors and workers attempt to maintain the 
same level of efficiency with fewer people.  Interpersonal problems arise when co-
workers have to assume an abuser’s job responsibilities, in addition to their own work 
(Orrick, 2004).  Gwaltney asserts that in law enforcement agencies, abuse of leave time 
can even lead to the loss of life (1994).   No wonder unscheduled absenteeism is 
considered “one of the most insidious drains of productivity of any of the forms of 
employee withdrawal” (Hinrichs, 1980, p.1).   
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 To combat the problem of employee absenteeism, organizations have adopted 
various strategies.  These strategies are as diverse as the organizations themselves 
and represent a wide array of potential solutions, both positive and negative. 
 Taking a wide view of organizations as a whole, authoritarian management styles 
and poor working conditions may contribute to absenteeism (Combating Absenteeism).  
Echoing this thought, Hirichs (1980) recommends that supervisory style, pay, and work 
hours all be examined to determine their affects on absenteeism.  Cronin (2000) even 
recommends that organizations adopt a no-fault attendance policy in lieu of traditional 
sick time because it does away with entitlement mentality. 
 Taking a more narrow focus, others suggest concentrating on positive incentives 
such as bonuses that would award either money (Gwaltney, 1994) or time (Hinrichs, 
1980) to an employee for outstanding attendance.  Smith (Part II, 2001) offers a number 
of potential solutions, including employee sick leave sharing, the conversion of sick 
leave to vacation time, the conversion of sick leave to insurance, and the conversion of 
sick leave to medical expenses.  Though overwhelming evidence suggests practices 
that positively influence absenteeism are preferred, Knight (1973) wrote of one company 
that allowed no paid time off for illnesses.  McNaught and Schofield (1998) suggest that 
employee activities be restricted while they are home on sick leave. 
  Despite the variety of strategies and ideas, one tactic that is nearly always 
suggested is the development of an effective attendance policy.  Such a policy would 
allow supervisors to get involved with employees who are frequently absent, hoping to 
uncover a problem that can be eliminated, or at least made better.  The idea is that the 
earlier a problem is identified, the more quickly an employee can return to work 
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(“Combating absenteeism,” n.d.).  And Perry (1997) points out that a poorly designed 
attendance policy can result in a costly lawsuit (p. 89). 
 Among the broad factors to consider when developing an attendance policy, 
according to Goodman and Atkin (1984), are: 
1. Clarity.  The policy must be easily understood by everyone in the 
organization. 
2. Consistency.  Is the policy enforced equally regarding every employee? 
3. Discretion.  Management discretion in excusing or not excusing an 
absence must be minimized. 
4. Communication.  The attendance policy must not only be published but it 
must be communicated directly to all employees.  In this communication 
process, management should make it clear that it intends to enforce the 
attendance policy. 
Organizations should implement a strategy of progressive discipline.  This is the 
idea that each succeeding step in the disciplinary process is more severe than the last.  
An oral warning would be followed by a written warning.  Further, a suspension would 
occur before an employee is terminated.  Progressive discipline works to the advantage 
of an organization attempting to discipline a problem employee. 
When developing an effective attendance policy, there are specific violations and 
issues which should be addressed.  A specific number of attendance violations should 
be stated in the policy.  The violations—which should include the number of absences as 
well as tardiness and the number of times an employee leaves early—should be 
recorded and tracked.  Advance notice of an absence should be required, when 
possible, and the failure to properly report an absence needs be recorded.  If employees 
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are required to submit medical certification of an illness, any failure to comply should be 
recorded (Smith, 2001, Part I). 
The San Angelo Police Department is an organization that struggles to deal with 
absenteeism, especially as an officer’s career winds down.  This struggle is the result of 
the civil service law, the failure of the municipality to compensate officers for accruing 
sick leave during their careers, and an ineffective attendance policy. 
The City of San Angelo has adopted Section 143 of the Texas Local Government 
Code, commonly known as civil service law.  Section 143.045(a) guarantees that civil 
service employees shall accumulate 1 ¼ sick leave days for each full month employed.  
Section 143.045(b) states that sick leave may be accumulated without limit. 
However, when an officer leaves the department, Section 143.045(c) only 
requires the municipality to pay the officer for ninety working days (720 hours) of 
accumulated sick leave.  As of August 2004, 33 of 136 civil service employees have 
accumulated at least 720 hours of sick leave.  As the situation exists now, beyond 
personal integrity, there is little reason for any of these officers to continue to accrue sick 
leave. 
So there is a tendency for San Angelo police officers to use sick days throughout 
their career, even when there is no legitimate illness, because they will not be 
compensated for accruing sick time beyond 720 hours. 
This practice becomes acute when an officer nears retirement.  Officers who 
have accrued over 720 sick leave hours generally will use the accrued excess sick 
leave, sometimes expending the entire amount!  In effect, retiring officers participate in 
an unofficial terminal leave program.   
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And because these officers are being carried as sick, they are still considered 
employees of the department and cannot be replaced until they officially retire from the 
agency.  In turn, this creates a manpower shortage that can affect the entire 
organization.       
As of September 2004, the San Angelo Police Department has 158 job positions 
for sworn personnel and currently has fourteen openings.  At the same time twenty-six 
officers are eligible to retire.  Of the officers eligible to retire, half have accrued over 720 
sick leave hours.  It is apparent that the department currently faces a potentially 
devastating manpower crisis.  
An ineffective sick leave policy does nothing to curb the practice of abusing sick 
leave.  The San Angelo Police Department’s sick leave policy simply states that sick 
days “will be used for illness or employees or their immediate families.  Employees will 
not be allowed to overdraw on sick days and will be docked for all time taken in excess 
of accumulated time. (San Angelo Police Department General Orders Manual, Chapter 
2, Section 2.86(E).” 
The City of San Angelo’s sick leave policy is just as ineffective.  A handbook 
given to new city employees states that “sick leave is granted to all city employees and it 
is for temporary inability of an employee to perform his normal duty and assignment due 
to personal illness or illness in the immediate family. . . . In the event of sick leave 
abuse, the supervisor may require a doctor’s statement. (City of San Angelo Employee 
Handbook, p. 1).” 
Though more detailed, the actual city policy manual adds very little to what is in 
the handbook.  Sick leave may still be used for “an inability . . . to perform his normal 
duties (City of San Angelo Policy Manual, 1991, Section 100, Part I(A)).”  Though both 
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the department and city sick leave policies are vaguely written, it is clear that any 
employee who uses sick leave at any point during their career when they are able to 
perform their normal duties, is in violation of the policy. 
However, the city does attempt to compensate employees who accumulate sick 
leave above ninety days.  The city policy states that “employees who have over ninety 
(90) days of sick leave may redeem up to ten (10) days of sick leave per year, minus 
any sick days used during the year, so long as said employee maintains (90) days of 
sick leave at time of redemption.”  However, the following stipulation is attached, 
“Redemption shall be paid at the rate of 50% of the employee’s daily wage rate. (City of 
San Angelo Policy Manual, 1991, Section 100, Part V(A), 1 and 2).” 
As described above, employees no longer view sick leave as a privilege but as 
an entitlement.  Employees are rarely interested in a buy-back provision that will only 
compensate them for half of what they feel they are owed.  And so, to be compensated 
entirely for what they believe they are owed, many San Angelo police officers do not 




 The intent of this research is to determine what options exist that will curb officers 
from using accrued sick leave during and at the end of their careers while fairly 
compensating them for accruing sick leave throughout their tenure.  This author 
believed that a reasonable solution exists and decided to conduct a written survey of 
other organizations in an attempt to find an answer.   
Dr. Sudhir Chawla, Professor of Marketing at Angelo State University, made a 
number of suggestions regarding the survey.  Based on these suggestions, it was 
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determined that the survey would be sent only to municipal law enforcement agencies 
serving populations between 75,000 and 125,000.  Sixty percent of the surveys would 
be sent to Texas police departments while forty percent would be sent out-of-state.  
Both the in-state and out-of-state surveys were constructed in a similar manner.   
A total of thirty surveys were sent out, eighteen to police departments in Texas 
and twelve to out-of-state departments.  Sixteen Texas police departments responded, 




 The average number of sworn personnel in Texas agencies is 188 and the 
average size of the municipality they serve is 110,272.  The average number of sworn 
personnel in out-of-state agencies was 195 and the average size of their jurisdiction was 
109,111.   
First, this author was interested in learning whether other Texas civil service 
agencies experienced a problem similar to that of San Angelo regarding officers abusing 
sick leave.  Twelve of the sixteen Texas agencies that replied indicated that they have 
adopted civil service laws and eleven of those bought back the minimum 720 accrued 
sick hours (Carrolton buys back 960 accrued sick hours). On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 
being very unlikely and 5 being very likely, the following questions were asked: 
1. Given your agency’s sick leave “buy back” policy, is an officer more likely to 
consistently use sick leave in violation of department policy during his/her 
tenure at the agency? 
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An administrator at the San Angelo Police Department, who was unaware of the 
research being conducted, rated San Angelo as a 5.  Overall, the average response was 
3.08.   
2. Given your agency’s sick leave “buy back” policy, is an officer more likely to 
consistently use sick leave in violation of department policy at the very end of 
his/her tenure at the agency? 
 Once more San Angelo responded with a 5.  The average of the other Texas civil 
service agencies was 3.67.  (Pasadena recently adopted civil service and officers 
currently near retirement will not be limited in the number of sick leave hours their 
municipality will buy back.  If Pasadena’s response were not included in Appendix 1, the 
average would be 3.81.)   
There is a clear indication that in agencies that have adopted the Texas Local 
Government Code, officers are neither likely nor unlikely to abuse sick leave during the 
majority of their career.  However, they are likely to abuse sick leave at the end of their 
career. 
 As a comparison, the non-civil service Texas agencies were also tallied.  There 
were only four respondents but the average answer to question #1 was 2.50.  The 
average response to question #2 was also 2.50.  Both answers indicate that non-civil 
service departments have fewer problems with officer abusing sick leave, especially at 
the end of their careers.  See Appendix 2. 
 The same two questions were asked of out-of-state agencies.  None of these 
agencies have adopted any state law similar to the Texas Local Government Code.  The 
average response to question #1 was 2.67 while the average response to question #2 
was 3.11.  See Appendix 3. 
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 One factor emerges when closely examining all of the data.  Ten of the non-civil 
services agencies—both in-state and out-of-state—only buy back a portion of accrued 
sick leave.  And two agencies do not buy back any accrued sick leave!  Only one 
agency buys back 100% of accrued sick leave.  It should be determined why these 
departments do not have as much sick leave abuse as Texas civil service agencies. 
 The answer becomes somewhat clear when you examine the answers to one 
other question contained in the surveys.  The respondents were asked what kind of 
compensation officers received for unused accrued sick leave?   
--Bloomington, Minnesota:  Officers accruing less than 600 hours of sick leave receive 
100% reimbursement at full pay.  For officers with more than 600 hours of accrued sick 
leave, the city places the monetary equivalent in a medical expense account. 
--Brockton, Massachusetts: The city buys back unused sick leave at full pay annually. 
--Santa Clara, California: The city purchases 75% of an officer’s accrued sick leave 
balance at full pay. 
--Pasadena, Texas:  Until 1992 officers were paid 100% of their unused accrued sick 
leave.  Since then Pasadena, Texas, has adopted the Texas Local Government Code. 
--Odessa, Texas:  Officers are paid 100% of their unused accrued sick leave. 
 In each of the above agencies, officers have some incentive to accrue as much 
sick leave as possible because it directly affects the benefit an officer receives upon 
retirement.  Interestingly, among these departments, the average to question #1 (sick 
leave abuse during a career) was 2.40—slightly better than all non-civil service agencies 
combined.  However, the average response to question #2 (sick leave abuse at the end 
of a career) was 2.00—a dramatic improvement over the combined non-civil service 
agencies! 
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 Finally, two last items need to be examined.  Of the departments surveyed, all but 
one (Bloomington, Minnesota) had a sick leave policy of some kind.  Of the fifteen 
departments with sick leave policies, just two (Lansing, Michigan and Tallahassee, 
Florida) addressed sick leave abuse at the end of a career.  None of the Texas civil 
service agencies addressed sick leave abuse at the end of a career, despite an 
admission that employees are likely to abuse sick leave at the end of their tenure.  It 
appears that for the most part, these municipalities and agencies do not wish to address 
sick leave problems despite the potential costs—not all of which are monetary. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The San Angelo Police Department, which already has openings for fourteen 
officers, faces the fact that twenty-six current officers can retire at any time.  And, given 
the past and current practice of the San Angelo Police Department, any retiring officer 
will be allowed to use any sick leave accrued during the officer’s career.  Yet, while a 
retiring officer is “burning” this accrued sick leave, a replacement cannot be hired 
because the retiring officer is considered to be a fulltime employee.  This information 
reflects a very dangerous situation in terms of a manpower shortage—the department 
may have to function with just three-quarters of its allotted manpower! 
 This research paper is not devoted to recruiting and hiring new officers.  
However, if an effective solution can be found to prevent retiring officers from “burning” 
excess sick leave, it would help alleviate some of this potential problem by finding an 
incentive for officers to work right up to the very end of their career and not to occupy 
positions that could be filled by new officers. 
 This author believed that some organizations were successfully addressing the 
problem of sick leave abuse.  The challenge of this research was to review existing 
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literature to determine the problems created by sick leave abuse and the potential 
solutions to the problem.  However, the bulk of the research would rest with a survey of 
municipal law enforcement agencies to determine which agencies had found potential 
solutions to this problem and to determine what those solutions were.  
 From the literature reviewed, it was apparent that sick leave abuse occurred in 
both private and public employment sectors.  Also, the cost of sick leave abuse was 
tremendous—not only in monetary terms but also in terms of organizational morale and 
efficiency. 
 Though the survey did not measure monetary costs nor organizational moral or 
efficiency, it did reveal useful information about law enforcement agencies, in particular 
Texas civil service departments.   
 First and foremost, officers do view sick leave benefits as an entitlement and 
when allowed to they will take action to get the entitlement.  In Texas civil service 
agencies, this is generally accomplished at the end of an officer’s career when the 
officer abuses sick leave to use all accrued, excess sick time.   
 Second, though most agencies have a sick leave policy, very few address 
absenteeism at the end of a career nor do anything to enforce the policy at the end of an 
officer’s tenure.  In effect, there is a difference between written policy and common 
practice and courts have consistently ruled that when there is a difference between 
written policy and actual practice, actual practice will take precedence. 
 Finally, those agencies which had employees least likely to abuse sick leave at 
the end of a career offered employees a positive incentive to accrue sick leave during 
their tenure.  One agency pays employees for all of their accrued sick leave upon 
retirement.  Another department pays 75% of accrued sick leave, providing an incentive 
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for officers to save more so that they could be paid more.  Yet another agency pays 
officers annually for any excess sick time they accrue during the year.  And one 
organization converts unused sick leave into a medical expense account upon 
retirement.   
 As suspected, the surveys support that officers who have an incentive to save 
sick leave will generally not abuse sick time during their career, instead opting for a pay-
off at the end of their tenures.  And options exist to create such incentives in law 
enforcement agencies.   
 It is apparent that for such incentives to be enacted, both the municipality and the 
officers must come to an understanding.  The municipality must realize that if it only 
compensates officers for the minimal amount of sick leave required by law, the 
municipality is contributing to a minimalist culture within the organization of city 
government and the municipality should not expect employees to exceed a standard it is 
not willing to exceed itself.   
 Conversely, employees must understand that if the municipality is willing to 
exceed minimal standards required by law, then the employees should be prepared and 
willing to be held to a higher standard as well.  For example, employees should be 
prepared to abide by an organization’s sick leave policy. 
 The author regrets that the surveys were so limited in number.  Had more 
surveys been sent out and returned, the results would have been strengthened.  
Further, more options would have likely been received. 
 Nonetheless, the results can be used by an organization—particularly a law 
enforcement agency—to begin examining the effects a sick leave policy has on its 
employees and how the policy may be affecting the agency in the long term.  Officers 
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expect to be fully compensated for the benefits they believed they are promised.  
Agencies expect officers to be at work, unless they are legitimately ill.  In locations 
where employee absenteeism is high, if the agency and the employees work together, 
solutions can be found that will benefit the agency, the employees, and most 
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Agency Population Officers Response #1 Response #2 
Abilene 
 







15,930 180 4 4 
Carrolton 1  14,000 157 3 4 
Grand Prairie 134,350 211 2 3 
Killeen 1  00,000 174 3 4 
McAllen 139,000 238 2 3 









1 being very unlikely and 5 being very likely, the following questions were asked: 
Pasadena 145,000 260 2 2 
San Angelo 90,000 131 5 5 
Tyler 90,000 182 4 5 
Unidentified 130,000 207 2 3 
Waco 114,934 220 3 4 
Wichita Falls 104,197 190 4 4 
     
Average 116,451 201 3.08 3.67 
Lewisville 86,000 3 2 2
Midland 95,000 65 4 5
Odessa 90,943 167 1
R chardson 95,000 46 2 2
     
Average 91,736 1 2 2.50 2.50 
 
#1:  Given your department’s sick leave “buy back” policy, is an officer more likely to 
consistently use sick leave in violation of department policy during his/her tenure at the agency? 
 
#2:  Given your agency’s sick leave “buy back” policy, is an officer more likely to consistently 





















Responses #1 and #2: 
 
On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being very unlikely and 5 being very likely, the following questions 
were asked: 
 
#1:  Given your department’s sick leave “buy back” policy, is an officer more likely to 
consistently use sick leave in violation of department policy during his/her tenure at the agency? 
 
#2:  Given your agency’s sick leave “buy back” policy, is an officer more likely to consistently 





























Responses #1 and #2: 
 















sick leave “buy back” policy, is an officer more likely to consistently use sick leave in violation 
of department policy during his/her tenure at the agency? 
Agency Population Officers Response #1 Response #2 
Bloomington, MN 85,000 114 1 1 
Brockton, MA 94,000 185 4 5 
Eugene, OR 140,000 184 3 4 
Lansing, MI 119,000 257 3 4 
Norman, OK 100,000 131 3 3 
Pueblo, CO 103,000 189 1 4 
Santa Clara, CA 105,000 150 3 1 
Tallahassee, FL 154,000 350 3 3 
Youngstown, OH 82,000 195 3 3 
     
Average 109,111 195 2.67 3.11 
 
#2:  Given your agency’s sick leave “buy back” policy, is an officer more likely to consistently 
use sick leave in violation of department policy at the very end of his/her tenure at the agency? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
